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ABSTRACT
Attitudes toward consumer protection are shaped primarily by complex
assumptions about human nature and its interaction with modern marketing.
The dominant perspective governing American consumer law is
individualism, a descriptive and frequently normative assumption that places
watchdog responsibilities on the individual consumer. This perspective is
described and analyzed through an examination of public policy arguments
about (1) advertising that targets children, (2) restrictions on consumption of
sugared beverages, and (3) creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Board. Individualism is then contrasted with the portrayal of consumers as
vulnerable. Specifically, insights from behavioral economics and
neuropsychology are used to gain a more accurate starting point for creating
consumer protection laws and regulations that reflect respect for consumers as
they are, rather than as who they are in deductive rational actor models of
market exchange.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I am done with the monster of ‘We,’ the word of serfdom, of plunder,
of misery, falsehood and shame.”1
Ayn Rand
“[A] thousand fibres connect you with your fellow-men . . . .”2
Henry Melvill
“We don’t accomplish anything in this world alone . . . .”3
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
1. AYN RAND, ANTHEM 112 (1946).
2. Reverend Henry Melvill, Partaking in Other Men’s Sins, Address at St.

Margaret’s Church, Lothbury, England (June 12, 1855), in THE GOLDEN LECTURES 450,
454 (1855), available at https://play.google.com/books/reader2?id=lt8EAAAAQAAJ&p
rintsec=frontcover&output=reader&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA884-IA121.
3. Works by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. SANDRA DAY
O’CONNOR COLL. OF LAW, http://www.law.asu.edu/library/RossBlakleyLawLibrary/San
draDayOConnor/WorksbyJusticeSandraDayOConnor.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
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Consumer law provides rules and incentives that encourage fair market
exchanges.4 The governing ethos of this area of law is the creation of a level
playing field. For consumers to fulfill their inclinations, they require honest
and complete presentation of the price, durability, and safety information of
optional goods or services, as well as an awareness of available options. In a
capitalistic framework, the greed that self-consciously fuels multiple
efficiency gains is equally capable of motivating suppliers of goods and
services to withhold or provide misleading information that distorts the
purchasing behavior of consumers. Hence, consumer law needs to serve as a
countervailing force moving the terms of the bargain in the direction of
respect for consumer welfare.
The needed scope of the countervailing force depends on assumptions
about what behavior is reasonable to expect from consumers. In other
words, what are the prevalent capabilities of people who form an agreement
with businesspeople intent on marketing their good or service so as to
maximize their profit? Suppose, for example, that individuals look at
themselves and others and see impressive information processors who
carefully discover all relevant information about goods and services and who
make choices based on their reflections about the kind of person they wish
to become. From this framework of expectations, consumer law should
facilitate these natural tendencies while keeping a regulatory eye on business
efforts to occlude access to the information the typical consumer desires to
evaluate.
The basic responsibility for the quality of market exchanges would then
naturally fall onto the consumers who are benefited or harmed by the logical
consequences of the choices they have made. This perspective for viewing
consumer behavior is but one element of a dominant way of thinking in the
United States: individualism. Part II of this Article describes individualism
in some detail as background for the basic argument advanced herein. When
an individual views typical consumers through the lens of individualism, it
follows that he or she would be pushed in the direction of minimalist
governmental efforts to level a playing field that needs little reshaping. Part
III analyzes the reasoning used by courts in three distinct markets and draws
out the compatibility of individualism with the courts’ reasoning. Parts IV
and V explain the legal implications of a more realistic appraisal of typical
consumers—one in which the full foibles of individuals’ minds are the basis
4. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1616 (2006); Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x; see generally Consumer Protection Laws,
LAWYERS.COM, http://consumer-law.lawyers.com/consumer-fraud/consumer-protectio
n-laws.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
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for consumer law.
II. INDIVIDUALISM AND CONSUMERS
Consumers make hundreds of decisions each week that result in
purchases that more or less meet their desires for dependable, healthful, and
fairly priced goods and services.5 To view consumers as if they are a latterday Robinson Crusoe is to expect them to have the time, mental acuity, and
chemical and engineering acumen that would enable them to represent their
interests effectively when they interact with businesses. Individualism is the
perspective that holds the individual responsible for the logical
consequences of the individual’s choices.6 In the words of Amitai Etzioni,
such a way of seeing the world emphasizes “me-ness,” and distrusts “weness.”7
A. Individual Choice as Primary Causal Agent
Individualism permeates American culture.8 On its surface, the word
individualism may look simple, a distinct value requiring little explanation.
However, individualism is in fact a complex idea reliant on several
questionable assumptions about an individual’s ability to be in control of his
or her own lives.9
The most important assumptions necessary for understanding
individualism is that human beings are “atomistic” entities.10 Atomism
assumes that human beings exist independent of, and unaffected by, external
5. See Consumer Expenditures—2013, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cesan.nr0.htm.
6. See generally Steven M. Lukes, Individualism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/286303/individualism (last visited Nov. 11,
2014).
7. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 128 (1993) (“An era dedicated to a return to weness would value and promote design that is pro-community.”).
8. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., INDIVIDUALISM & COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 3–10 (1987).
9. See Markella B. Rutherford, A Bibliographic Essay on Individualism, 4
HEDGEHOG REV. 116, 116 (2002), available at http://www.iasc-culture.org/THR/archive
s/Individualism/4.1LRutherford.pdf.
10. Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et. al., Advancing the Rights of Poor and WorkingClass Women in an Individualistic Culture, 2 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 41, 41 n.2 (1996)
(explaining that atomism posits that human beings are “independent, disembodied
entities”).
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influences (e.g., parents, genes, luck, and ethnicity).11 This atomistic
assumption about human nature is fundamental to understanding American
individualism. If the direction of people’s lives is firmly in their hands, then
individuals are primarily responsible for the achievements and failures in
their lives. While it is often difficult to distinguish when this assumption of
atomism is normative or descriptive, in both cases responsibility for poverty,
wealth accumulation, antisocial conduct, and entrepreneurial insight belongs
to the individual experiencing these conditions.12
To maintain the perspective of personal choice as the basis for
explaining alternative directions taken by the lives of individuals, those
comfortable with individualism and its implications actively discourage
reasoning that places weight on causal forces outside the control of
individuals.13
The value preference of self-reliance over interdependence flows
logically from the assumption that human beings have the ability to control
11. HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM 2 (1995) (explaining
that individualism assumes human beings are “individuals who view themselves as
independent of collectives”). Because atomism assumes that humans are unaffected by
societal influences, this idea concludes that only they are in charge of creating their own
destinies and realities. See id.; see also Michael Dominic Meuti, Legalistic Individualism:
An Alternative Analysis of Kagan’s Adversarial Legalism, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 319, 332 (2004) (“[American individualism] tend[s] to ‘attribute events to
internal individual causes.’ Each individual is, therefore, the master of his own destiny,
and is responsible for his position in life.” (footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Gregory Jordan, The Causes of Poverty—Cultural v. Structural, 1
PERSPS. IN PUB. AFF. 18, 19 (2004), available at http://asu.edu/mpa/Jordan.pdf
(“[S]cholars argue that poverty is largely the result of social and behavioral deficiencies
in individuals that ostensibly make them less economically viable within conventional
society.”).
13. See Ernest Wallwork, Ethical Analysis of Research Partnerships with
Communities, 18 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 57, 57–58 (2008) (explaining the destiny of
the individual in sociological terms: “Against the radical individualist assumption that
individuals make decisions freely when they are unconstrained by social affiliations, the
community-research partnership movement regards the individual as embedded in
narrative traditions, institutions, roles, shared goals, and environments (natural and
social), without which human beings can neither survive nor flourish morally.”). See also
Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 323–25 (2006) (discussing
the debate about human agency and whether agency is independent of, or intertwined
with, societal externalities). Carle identifies that “a person’s attachments to a community
and its socially derived values constitute the person herself; we could not understand the
concept of a person separate from these attachments.” Id. at 326 (citing MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 90 (1982)).
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their realities and destinies.14 Because individualism assumes that human
beings function independent of societal forces and have the ability to create
their own realities, the individual’s dependence on any external entity or
resource is consequently viewed as unnecessary—and oftentimes
inappropriate.15 The self that emerges from this value perspective is more of
a separate sovereign than a partner or a member of a community of
intertwined relationships.16
Because this value preference is so powerful, many Americans resist
acknowledging that they are, in fact, dependent on government entities in
some fashion.17 There is a lack of recognition of the depth of government
assistance that affects every citizen, including the seemingly affluent
citizen.18 One receives public subsidies, for example, and sees them as just
14. See, e.g., Anita Casalina, Self Reliance and Interdependence, BILLIONS
RISING (Jan. 28, 2013), http://billionsrising.org/self-reliance-and-interdependent/
(“[D]ependence on . . . others doesn’t unleash the human potential anywhere near as
much as self reliance.”).
15. See TRIANDIS, supra note 11.
16. See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (“[W]hen people are reduced to isolated
individuals, . . . public discussion and popular initiative will languish . . . .”).
17. Cf. DAVID LEAKE & RHONDA BLACK, ESSENTIAL TOOLS: IMPROVING
SECONDARY EDUCATION & TRANSITION FOR YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES, 18 (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.ncset.org/publications/essentialtools/diversity/EssentialTo
ols_Diversity.pdf (discussing how American individualism is a result of a “standard of
living that allows self-sufficiency . . . to be the expected norm”).
18. See Firmin Debrabander, Deluded Individualism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/deluded-individualism/?_php=true&_t
ype=blogs&_r=0. Debrabander’s article makes note that an incredibly high percentage
of Americans believe they are not reliant on government assistance and that they are
totally self-reliant, despite the fact that mortgage interest deductions help the wealthy,
farm subsidies lower food prices across the board, federal mortgage assurances lower
interest rates generally, and an exceedingly large Department of Defense employs
hundreds of thousands of Americans. Id. A study conducted by Pew Research supports
Debrabander’s conclusion. See The American-Western European Values Gap, PEW
RESEARCH GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-am
erican-western-european-values-gap/ (last updated Feb. 29, 2012). The study relied on a
survey comparing the opinions of European citizens to those of American citizens
regarding assumptions of individualism. See id. One of the questions on this survey asked
participants whether they agreed that “success in life is pretty much determined by forces
outside our control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the survey,
the percentage of Americans agreeing that success is due to forces outside an individual’s
control was less than all four European countries’ respondents. Id. For a similar assertion
see MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 32 (1999) (“Compared with the more socially
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recognition of prior personal excellence.19
This individualistic value of self-reliance can also be witnessed in the
American focus on the importance of “hard work.”20 The wisdom of
expecting and practicing self-reliance played a major role in the 2012 U.S.
presidential campaign.21 During this campaign, Barack Obama and Mitt
Romney pushed and pulled at the country’s acceptance of assumptions of
individualism. President Obama mocked, in a roundabout way, certain
individualistic beliefs of “wealthy, successful Americans.”22 Obama pushed
a nonindividualistic notion that people do not become wealthy and
successful through their own hard work and determination alone; instead,
everyone needs assistance from social networks to permit personal
development.23

minded Europeans, Americans are thought to place a higher value on self-reliance and
individual initiative and to recoil from the idea of government responsibility for
individuals’ well-being.”).
19. See Debrabander, supra note 18.
20. See Christopher Angevine, The Consociative Value of Work: What
Homelessness-To-Work Programs Can Teach Us About Reforming and Expanding
Prison Labor, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 19, 19 (2009) (“Americans’ devotion to work may have
manifold causes—among them a tax structure that does not disincentivize extra work,
social concern for material wealth, and a culture of self-sufficiency and raw
individualism—but that commitment has deep roots in the very fabric of the nation’s
history.”).
21. See Gary Moss, Guillory Sees 2012 Presidential Campaign as a Conflict Between
Individualism & Community, UNIV. OF N.C. GAZETTE (Aug. 21, 2012), http://gazette.
unc.edu/2012/08/21/guillory-sees-2012-presidential-race-as-a-conflict-between-individu
alism-and-community/ (“[T]here is really a big issue undergirding the campaign. That is:
To what extent is the United States a country in which government is one expression of
community, and to what extent is the United States a gathering of independent
capitalists?” (quoting Ferrel Guillory, professor of journalism at the University of North
Carolina)).
22. Kelefa Sanneh, Sloganeering, THE NEW YORKER (August, 13, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/08/13/sloganeering (internal quotation marks
omitted). President Obama told one crowd of Democratic supporters:
If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There
was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this
unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive.
Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business, that—you
didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.

Id.
23. See id.
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In response to Obama’s attempts to debunk the tenets of individualism,
Romney embraced individualism and appealed to the country’s classic
values of self-reliance and autonomy with slogans such as “We Built
America,” “Built by Us,” and “Government Didn’t Build My Business, I
Did.”24 To leave no doubt about his fealty to individualism, Romney spent
time during his campaign lauding the individual successes of visible business
owners Papa John (John Schnatter), Steve Jobs, and Henry Ford.25 He spoke
at great length about the genius and hard work these individuals put into
creating their successful firms.26
B. Individualism and Public Policy Assisting Consumers
Once Americans understand the assumptions and value preferences
behind the idea of American individualism, they can begin to make sense of
the popularity in the United States of slogans like “personal responsibility”
and “freedom from government assistance.”27 Individualism provides
intellectual support for policies that place responsibility on individuals to
achieve their own goals.28 Governmental policies that would assist
individuals in achieving their goals are pictured as an obstruction to
individual efficacy.29
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.
Cf. TRIANDIS, supra note 11 (explaining that American individualism assumes
human beings are generally independent); Meuti, supra note 11.
28. See TRIANDIS, supra note 11; Meuti, supra note 11.
29. See GILENS, supra note 18, at 34. Gilens’s study of American attitudes toward
forms of government found that
when asked whether “government is responsible for the well-being of all its
citizens and has an obligation to take care of them” or “people are responsible
for their own well-being and have an obligation to take care of themselves,” 74
percent of Americans place the responsibility on individuals rather than
government.

Id. See also Gregory B. Markus, American Individualism Reconsidered, in CITIZENS AND
POLITICS: PERSPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 401, 407 (James H. Kuklinski,
ed., 2001). Markus explains how the popular belief of individualism has led to popular
liberal thought that lifts up the idea of “limited government” in the United States. See
id. The author states:
The image of humans as self-determining creatures . . . remains one of the most
powerful dimensions of liberal thought. For all of us raised in liberal societies,
our deep attachment to freedom takes its meaning and value from the
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Individualism provides legitimacy for patterns of inequality. A logical
extension of individualism is the deep belief that those who hold a large
percentage of the country’s wealth have “earned” their wealth, and those
who are in poverty have “earned” their lack of financial success.30
Consumers with greater wealth have more time and access to expert advice,
relevant information, and product options. Consequently, individualism
fosters a sense of quietude toward the needs of consumers as a group to have
social assistance in making better consumption decisions.31 The consumers
at the top of the income and wealth pyramid have demonstrated to an
audience of voters suffused with individualism that individuals are quite
capable of effectuating their interests as consumers.32
The point here is that the legal protection of consumers does not evolve
in the abstract. It emerges from a context that leans on a particular
understanding of who an American consumer should be. The more that legal
policy is shaped by individualism, the more consumers will be expected to
protect themselves, making use of the rational calculating skills they are
assumed to have or to somehow learn.
III. THE SOUND OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IN AN INDIVIDUALISTIC
CULTURE
Assumptions, by their nature, are hidden. They do their work below
presupposition of our self-determining, self-making nature: that is what freedom
is for, the exercise of that capacity.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989)). These attitudes result
in derogation of anyone vulnerable and in need of governmental policy assistance. See,
e.g., JILLIAN JIMENEZ, SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE: TOWARD THE CREATION
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 52 (2010) (“The consequences of these values for
persons who cannot work, are unemployed, or are working at marginal jobs are
punishing.”).
30. See BRUCE S. JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE: ENGAGING
HISTORY TO ADVANCE SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 46 (7th
ed. 2012) (stating that conservatives “begin with the belief that members of some
vulnerable populations often create their relatively low income by not prizing hard work
to the extent of affluent persons”).
31. See id. at 47 (discussing how some are “unwilling to increase taxes to fund social
policies that might reduce inequality among vulnerable populations”).
32. See Meuti, supra note 11, at 336. Meuti concludes that because of their strong
values of individualism, U.S. citizens may fail to understand the need for any collective
policies or the need for policies that go against the grain of values of self-sufficiency and
independence by focusing on the interdependence of citizens and society. Id. at 346–47.
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the surface.33 The details of arguments about specific “consumer protection”
initiatives, important as they are, will be enacted, modified, or rejected by
interest groups that form their arguments using a normative assumption
about who consumers should be. As demonstrated in the following three
consumer protection policy struggles, the assumption of individualism only
occasionally makes its presence known. Yet, the visible reasoning would
make little sense outside an individualistic framework.
A. Regulation of Advertising to Children
Vigorous opposition to government consumer protection efforts in the
United States is the norm.34 One of the most notorious examples of
successful opposition to consumer protection is the debacle known as “Kid
Vid.”35 In 1978, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposed limiting,
and even banning, certain advertising directed toward children.36 The FTC
was concerned that “television advertising for any product directed to
children who are too young to appreciate the selling purpose of, or otherwise
comprehend or evaluate, . . . [was] inherently unfair and deceptive.”37 The
FTC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking invited comment on banning all
television advertisements targeting young children, banning advertising for
sugary snack foods aimed at older children (on the basis of the risk of tooth
decay), and requiring that television advertisements of other sugared foods

33. See generally M. NEIL BROWNE AND STUART M. KEELEY, ASKING THE RIGHT
QUESTIONS: A GUIDE TO CRITICAL THINKING 59–60 (11th ed. 2015) (noting that
unstated assumptions are important in understanding an argument). This point
highlights a paradox: the most significant component of reasoning is often the one most
likely to be overlooked. See id.
34. See, e.g., Pat Garofalo, What’s Behind Big-Name Opposition to Consumer
Protection Reform? The Same Love of Big Profits that Drives Big Banks, NEXT NEW
DEAL (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/whats-behind-big-name-oppositionconsumer-protection-reform-same-love-big-profits-drives-big-banks; Tamara Keith,
New Consumer Protection Agency Faces Opposition, NPR (July 21, 2011), http://www.
npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502/new-consumer-protection-agency-faces-opposition.
35. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert H. Mnookin, The “Kid Vid”
Crusade, 61 NAT’L AFF. 90 (1980).
36. Id.; TERESA MORAN SCHWARTZ & ALICE SAKER HARDY, FTC RULEMAKING:
THREE BOLD INITIATIVES AND THEIR LEGAL IMPACT 12 (2004), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/FTC%2090th%20Anniversary%20S
ymposium/040922schwartzhrdy.pdf.
37. See DAVID L. GEE, THE ROLE OF FOOD MARKETING ON CHILDHOOD OBESITY
5 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.cwu.edu/~geed/547/
food%20marketing%20and%20childhood%20obesity.ppt.
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be balanced with health-nutrition disclosures when the audience consisted
of a substantial percentage of older children.38
Television networks, advertising agencies, food and toy companies,
and even cigarette manufacturers opposed the FTC’s proceedings,
attempted to stop hearings, and filed lawsuits against the FTC.39 The FTC
Deputy Director for Consumer Protection who was in charge of the
rulemaking procedure discussed the breadth of the opposition:
[W]e were opposed by the cereal industry, the sugar industry, the candy
industry, the toy industry and the broadcast industry. The farmers were
against us because they were raising wheat that was being used in
sugared cereals. We even had the cigarette industry against us. Why?
Although cigarettes weren’t being advertised to children, the cigarette
industry was convinced that if we were successful in this proceeding,
they would be next. So they raised all this money to oppose this rulemaking proceeding. They used tactics that really had never been seen
before but now are pretty common.40

The food industry framed the issue as a prime example of over-exuberant
government interference.41 The Washington Post dubbed the FTC a
“National Nanny.”42 It asked, “[W]hat are the children to be protected from?
The candy and sugar-coated cereals that lead to tooth decay? Or the inability
or refusal of their parents to say no?”43 The Washington Post went on to
argue:
The food products will still be there, sitting on the shelves of the local
supermarkets after all, no matter what happens to the commercials. So
38. See generally id.; Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967–72 (Apr. 27, 1978)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 461); FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISED ADVERTISING
TO CHILDREN 1–12 (1978) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]; Tracy Westen, Government
Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The Federal Trade Commission & The KidVid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 79–80 (2005).
39. See Westen, supra note 38, at 87.
40. Id.
41. See MICHAEL MOSS, SUGAR FAT SALT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS HOOKED US
76–81 (2013).
42. Westen, supra note 38, at 83 (quoting Editorial, Farewell to the National Nanny,
WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1981, at A14) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT 69–70 (1983).
43. PERTSCHUK, supra note 42, at 70 (quoting Editorial, The FTC as National
Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A14).

168

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 63

the proposal, in reality, is designed to protect children from the
weaknesses of their parents—and the parents from the wailing
insistence of their children. That, traditionally, is one of the roles of a
governess—if you can afford one. It is not a proper role of government.44

That parents should possess the knowledge and mental habits that would
propel them to just say “no” in particular instances is taken for granted.
Legislative hearings produced 6,000 pages of testimony and 60,000
pages of written comment.45 Before the FTC took final action,46 Congress
passed the FTC Improvement Act of 1980, which specifically denied the FTC
authority to issue any rule regarding children’s advertising on the basis that
the advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice.47 “These amendments
also prevented the Commission for a period of three years from initiating
any new rulemaking proceeding restricting commercial advertising based on
unfairness, and this prohibition was continued” and effectively “deprived the
agency of a Congressional authorization for 14 years.”48
Food marketing to children continues to be both a big consumer
protection concern and a big business issue.49 From an individualistic
perspective, restricting the freedom of firms to sell their products to children
makes little sense. The parent—acting as a surrogate for the child—will, or
44. Id. (quoting The FTC as National Nanny, supra note 43).
45. Westen, supra note 38, at 80 (citing FTC, FINAL STAFF REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, IN THE MATTER OF CHILDREN’S ADVERTISING (1981)).
46. The FTC terminated the Kid-Vid rulemaking in 1981 without taking any action;
it left behind a voluminous record of opposition. Id. (citing Children’s Advertising, 46
Fed. Reg. 48,710, 48,712 (Oct. 2, 1981) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 461)). The FTC
concluded that the only effective remedy would be a total ban on advertising to children,
but this would end children’s TV programming. Children’s Advertising, 46 Fed. Reg. at
48,712.
47. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374, 378 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)) (“The Commission shall not
have any authority to promulgate any rule in the children’s advertising proceeding
pending on the date of the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act of 1980 or in any substantially similar proceeding on the basis of a determination by
the Commission that such advertising constitutes an unfair act or practice in or affecting
commerce.” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
48. Roscoe B. Starek, III, Former Comm’r, FTC, The ABCs at the FTC: Marketing
and Advertising to Children, Address at the Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. (July 25, 1997),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1997/07/abcs-ftc-marketing-and-advert
ising-children (footnote omitted).
49. See, e.g., Food Marketing to Youth, RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POL’Y & OBESITY,
http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/what_we_do.aspx?id=4 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
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should, calmly, rationally, and with both eyes fixed on the long-run
developmental needs of the child, direct purchases in an optimal fashion.
This form of reasoning presumes that no advertisement can overcome the
skill of the parent in making these decisions adroitly.
B. New York City’s Big-Soda Cap
An exploding can of soda is an apt visual for the controversy that
bubbled up concerning a proposed regulation to combat obesity in New
York City.50 A storm of opinion and opposition began in the summer of 2012
when Mayor Michael Bloomberg issued a press release51 about the dangers
and cost of obesity to New Yorkers.52
The press release notes that “[o]besity is the second leading cause of
preventable premature death, killing 5,800 New Yorkers annually, and is the
only major public health issue in America that is getting worse.”53 It further
notes that “[o]ne in three adult New Yorkers has diabetes or pre-diabetes,”
and “[s]ugary beverages are [the] key driver of the obesity epidemic.”54
Based on a plan proposed by the Mayor, the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOH) proposed that the New
York City Health Code be amended to include a 16-ounce size limit on
sugary beverages offered and sold in food-service establishments.55 The
50. See generally Henry Goldman & Duane D. Stanford, NYC Mayor Bloomberg
Seeks Ban on Super-Size Soft Drinks, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomb
erg.com/news/2012-05-31/nyc-mayor-bloomberg-seeks-ban-on-super-size-soft-drinks.ht
ml.
51. Press Release, New York City, Mayor Bloomberg, Public Advocate DeBlasio,
Manhattan Borough President Stringer, Montefiore Hospital CEO Safyer, Deputy
Mayor Gibbs and Health Commissioner Farley Highlight Health Impacts of Obesity
(June 5, 2012), http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f
1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%
3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012a%2Fpr200-12.html&cc
=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1.
52. Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Bloomberg’s
Soda Ban, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/
nyregion/most-new-yorkers-oppose-bloombergs-soda-ban.html.
53. Press Release, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. See id. Official public comment followed, and a hearing on the proposed
amendment was held on July 24, 2012, before the Board of Health. See Memorandum
from Susan Kasangra to the Members of the Bd. Of Health, N.Y. City Dep’t of Health
and Mental Hygiene, Summary and Response to Public Hearing and Comments
Received Regarding Amendment of Article 81 of the New York City Health Code to
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“Soda Cap” was born.
Supporters called Bloomberg “a fearless leader in the arena of food
policy”56 and advocated, among other things, that the Soda Cap would
reduce consumption of soda, which was one “piece of the puzzle” necessary
to protect the health and wellness of children and adults.57 Regarding the
individual’s interest in choosing for oneself, one advocate argued that
“trivial issues of personal freedom . . . pale before the public health and
welfare exigency.”58 This echoed Mayor Bloomberg’s viewpoint that it is
“the role of government to ‘improve the health and longevity of its
citizens.’”59 Indeed, from an economic perspective, the lure of antiobesity
regulation is strong in view of the healthcare costs associated with obesity
and weight gain.60
Establish Maximum Sizes for Beverages Offered and Sold in Food Service
Establishments 1 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/
pdf/boh/article81-response-to-comments.pdf [hereinafter DOH Hearing Summary]. The
Board of Health received more than 38,000 written comments about the Soda Cap, and
while only 16 percent opposed the Soda Cap, opposition was vigorous and wellpublicized. Id.; see Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 52; see also Jason Kessler, NYC
Soda Ban Unfair to Small, Minority-Owned Businesses, CNN (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.
cnn.com/2013/01/23/health/new-york-large-drinks/. Ironically, the iconic “Big Gulp”
from 7-Eleven was exempted from the ban because grocery and convenience stores are
regulated by the State of New York, not the City of New York. Kessler, supra.
56. Press Release, supra note 51 (quoting Food Policy Coordinator Kim Kessler).
57. Public Comments to the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
regarding the Proposed Amendment to Health Code Article 81, at 67 [hereinafter Public
Comments]. Portion sizes for beverages have increased steadily over the years. See The
New (Ab)normal, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/makinghealtheasier/images/cdc-new-abnor
mal-infographic.png (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
58. Public Comments, supra note 57, at 40; see also id. at 326 (“While the idea of
limiting the portion sizes of sugary drinks sold in food service establishments does raise
some concerns regarding the level of government regulation of personal choice, the city’s
growing prevalence of obesity is so alarming that it deserves significant attention in the
form of this proposed amendment.” (public comment submitted by The Committee for
Hispanic Children and Families, Inc.)).
59. Becket Adams, It’s the Government’s ‘Role’ to Improve Your Health:
Bloomberg Responds to ‘Nanny’ Critics, THEBLAZE (June 14, 2012), http://www.the
blaze.com/stories/2012/06/14/its-the-governments-role-to-improve-your-health-bloomb
erg-responds-to-nanny-critics/ (quoting Mayor Bloomberg).
60. See Stella Daily, Of Freedom and Fat: Why Anti-Obesity Laws are Immoral, 4
OBJECTIVE STANDARD 53, 54 (2009) (citing a 2002 economic analysis that found more
than nine percent of total medical expenditures were attributed to conditions related to
weight gain and obesity and that half of that amount was paid for by Medicare and
Medicaid).
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In sharp contrast, opposition centered on the consumer’s right and
ability to “choose for themselves how to manage bodily care, to make
informed diet decisions, to ingest calories and to control how much of a
lawful and safe product they choose to consume.”61 For others, the “bottom
line [was] that consumers do not need [the government] to tell them what to
drink or what size” because “New Yorkers have the right to make their own
decisions.”62 It was argued that “the government has to [allow] an individual
to take responsibility for their own actions”63 even if those actions have
harmful repercussions.64
Even those who conceded that limiting the size of sugary drinks was
merely an intrusion designed to address a serious health issue found it to be
a “situation where government regulation has gone too far” because it
impacted people’s right to make their own consumption decisions.65
Viewed through the principles of objectivism, government attempts to
protect citizens violate the moral imperative that individuals can and should
make consumption and life decisions for themselves.66 Moderate forms of
individualism allow the government to support education about obesity and

61. Public Comments, supra note 57, at 638 (brief submitted by the American
Beverage Association).
62. Id. at 955 (public comment offered by a New York City Councilmember).
63. Id. at 30.
64. See id. at 33 (“Enough is enough! . . . This is America and I want to make my
own choices [regarding] what to eat, smoke and how to live. Leave us alone!”); see also
id. at 3 (“You have got to realize that we do NOT live in Russia. We live in the USA,
and, we have our freedom to do as we please, as long as we are in the confines of the
law.”).
65. See id. at 1 (public comment offered by several New York City
Councilmembers).
66. Individualism, in many respects, forms a partnership with objectivist reasoning,
which is premised on the moral right to make one’s own decisions. See Craig Biddle,
What is Objectivism?, OBJECTIVE STANDARD, https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/
what-is-objectivism/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (“Objectivism advocates the virtues of
rational self-interest . . . .”); see, e.g., Ari Armstrong, Government Involvement in Organ
Donation Constitutes Death Panels, OBJECTIVE STANDARD (June 5, 2013),
https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/2013/06/government-involvement-in-organdonation-constitutes-death-panels/ (arguing that the government’s only role in
regulating organ transplants should be to protect individual rights and enforce contracts,
even those contracts that involve the sale of organs). Individualism seems to emanate
more from a human nature assumption about what it is reasonable to assume adults can
do intermixed with the expectation that they should be held accountable in terms of
responsibility for any failings to make decisions consistent with that capability.
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healthy lifestyle choices but do not allow government to make those choices
for its citizens.67 Even a health crisis does not justify regulation for this type
of reasoning:
[A] person’s life is his to live as he sees fit, and the fact that his judgment
is his basic means of living, a person has a moral right to sell or consume
whatever foods he chooses, as long as he does not violate anyone else’s
rights (e.g., by committing fraud or theft) in the process.68

Opponents of the regulation cautioned against government intrusion
cloaked in the guise of consumer protection.69 The Soda Cap, to them, was
“a step closer to coming into someone’s home and telling them what to do.”70
It raised the specter of “constant encroachment of government intrusion in
day to day lives,”71 and was “not only absurd, but it takes away one of our
most basic rights as Americans, freedom.”72 They warned that the logic
behind the Soda Cap had no rational stopping point: “The same logic that
supports the proposed rule could also result in a law insisting that all families
consume a set menu dictated by a Bureau of Government-Prescribed Eating,
to ensure that everyone obtains the governmentally preferred caloric
balance and distribution of nutrients.”73
In this chilling scenario, the government would prescribe calorie and
nutrient requirements like the Soda Cap “through sweeping and wooden
rules, designed for mass enforcement, without any mechanism for the
individualized considerations that are the hallmark of true health

67. In this perspective, a corollary to a free society is that government’s role as
public servant does not permit it to rule in ways that it deems good for its people. See
Public Comments, supra note 57, at 477 (public comment submitted by the Washington
Legal Foundation).
68. Daily, supra note 60, at 56; see also id. at 57 (arguing that where the government
has created for itself a legal right to interfere, such laws should be repealed).
69. See, e.g., Public Comments, supra note 57, at 1 (public comment offered by
several New York City Councilmembers).
70. Id. at 574.
71. Id. at 30.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id. at 639–40 (emphasis added) (comments submitted by the American
Beverage Association). Readers of the increasingly popular genre of dystopian fantasy
may recognize a world in which government delivers prepackaged daily food designed
to provide different classes of society with different nutrients for growth, performance,
etc. See generally ALLY CONDIE, MATCHED (2010).
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assessments.”74 A “Bureau of Government-Prescribed Eating”75 may sound
like the stuff of dystopian fiction, but this libertarian reasoning makes a
complementary partner for individualistic thinking. In both streams of
thought, individuals are expected to provide their own consumer
protection.76
The Soda Cap was passed by the New York City Board of Health but
was deemed invalid by a judge the day before it was to take effect.77 The
appellate court affirmed this decision, holding that the Soda Cap was invalid
because the Board of Health exceeded the bounds of its authority.78 Legal
wrangling over the Soda Cap and other consumer protection proposals in
New York continue to highlight the fundamental conflict between
community responsibility for consumer welfare79 and individualism.
74. Public Comments, supra note 57, at 640 (comments submitted by the American
Beverage Association).
75. Id. at 639–40.
76. See What is the Libertarian Party?, LIBERTARIAN PARTY, http://www.lp.org/intr
oduction/what-is-the-libertarian-party (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (stating
Libertarianism “respects [the] unique and competent individual”).
77. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *3, *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 3, 2013), aff’d, No. 05505, 2013 WL 3880139, at *16 (N.Y. App. Div. July 30, 2013).
The petitioners argued that consumers must have the ability to make their own life
choices, without regard to whether those choices have a collective effect. Petitioner’s
Notice of Verified Petition at 16, N.Y. Statewide Coal. Of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce, 2013 WL 3880139. The petitioners further argued that businesses have the
right to make their own choices about how to market and package their products. See id.
at 5.
78. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 3880139, at
*16. During oral argument, the appellate court was reportedly skeptical of the Board of
Health’s claims; one judge “asked if the city might [next] limit scoops of ice cream.”
Michael M. Grynbaum, City Argues to Overturn Ruling That Prevented Limits on Sugary
Drinks, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/nyregion/bloo
mberg-presses-for-reversal-of-court-ban-on-sugary-drink-limits.html.
79. Bloomberg continues to support the Soda Cap and has stated that “while other
people will wring their hands over the problem of sugary drinks, in New York City, we’re
doing something about it” and that because “[w]e have a responsibility as human beings
to do something, to save each other, to save the lives of ourselves, our families, our
friends, and all of the rest of the people that live on God’s planet. . . . [t]hroughout its
history, the New York City Board of Health has taken bold action to confront major
public health problems.” Mayor Bloomberg Discusses City’s Efforts to Combat Obesity
and Sugary Beverage Regulation, NYC.GOV (March 11, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/090-13/mayor-bloomberg-city-s-efforts-combat-obesity-sugar
y-beverage-regulation#/0 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mayor Bloomberg
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C. Individualism and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Laws intended to protect consumers in financial markets are more
complex than ounce limitations on sugary drinks, and opposition to such
laws share roots in individualism. In response to the 2008 financial market
collapse, Congress sought to create a Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau80 (CFPB) “so that the spectacular failure of consumer protection at
the root of the [financial regulatory crisis would] never [be] repeated.”81 The
rationale was that the government doesn’t “allow toy companies to sell toys
that could hurt our kids. . . . [or] electronics companies to sell defective
appliances” and shouldn’t permit financial service companies to sell
“dangerous financial products.”82 Proponents said the CFPB would be a
“cop on the beat” and a “watchdog and protector” in “response to exploding
complexity, scope, and scale of new financial instruments and markets.”83
Hearing these arguments begs the question: why are the same
arguments not used in a huge array of consumer markets? Apparently, the
answer is in the scope of the apparent tragedy resulting from market
exchanges in particular purchasing decisions. However, to return to the
Announces New Legislation to Further Reduce Smoking Rate, NYC.GOV (March 18,
2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/102-13/mayor-bloomberg-new-leg
islation-further-reduce-smoking-rate (discussing Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed law to
the New York City Council to forbid stores from prominently displaying cigarette and
tobacco products).
80. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203 § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010), (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2010))
[hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act].
81. The Administration’s Proposal to Modernize the Financial Regulatory System:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
(statement of Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban
Affairs) [hereinafter Proposal to Modernize]; see generally Community and Consumer
Advocates’ Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009); Regulatory
Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing Before the
H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2009); Banking Industry Perspectives on the Obama
Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before H. Fin. Servs.
Comm., 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009).
82. Proposal to Modernize, supra note 81, at 2 (statement of Sen. Christopher J.
Dodd). A dangerous financial product was described as one that the lender knows
cannot be repaid. See id.
83. Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s
New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking Hous. and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 49, 66 (2009) (statements by Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut
Attorney General) [hereinafter Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency].
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earlier example of advertising to children, it is difficult to understand on its
face why a product that harms a child’s health would be less likely to quell
individualistic arguments than when the product is a mortgage.
Opponents predictably decried the monstrous new financial nanny that
would infringe on the rights of liberty, choice, privacy, and innovation,84
calling it an “unprecedented departure by the U.S. government from some
of the fundamental ideas . . . that have underpinned U.S. society since its
inception.”85 The individualism argument was inherent in claims that law
limited consumer choice by taking away the individual’s right to decide what
financial products were best for them.86 Choice87 was framed as the central
issue: one critic described a family that was prevented from choosing a home

84. See David Francis, Critics Say Consumer Bureau is an Overreaching Monster,
FISCAL TIMES (May 30, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/30/Critic
s-Say-Consumer-Bureau-is-an-Overreaching-Monster. Opponents did not suggest that
all consumer financial protection measures were an affront to individualism but argued
that the regulatory system in place already appropriately protected the consumer.
Hearing, Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, supra note 83, at 72
(statement by Edward L. Yingling, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Am.
Bankers Ass’n).
85. Hearing, Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, supra note 83, at
133–34 (statement by Peter Wallison). As is often the case, liberty arguments were
intermingled with individualism opposition. Opponents quoted legal icons to argue that
the desire to protect consumers made the creation of the new agency especially suspect:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government’s purposes are beneficial. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rules. The greater dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.

Id. at 134 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 479 (1928)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (statement by Peter Wallison).
86. Proponents of the agency accused detractors of misrepresenting its purpose,
arguing that the CFPB would not limit customer choice: “[The CFPB] will not make
choices for consumers or deny them access to products and services. . . . [but would]
assure that consumers fully understand the financial realities and consequences of
financial obligations, credit cards or loans they are considering before they make
commitments.” Hearing, Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, supra note
83, at 66 (statement by Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut Attorney General).
87. When an argument focuses on the meme of choice, it typically flows from
libertarian ideas. See What is the Libertarian Party?, supra note 76. On the other hand,
proponents of individualism tend to prefer memes centering on responsibility. See supra
Part II. But both forms of argument are mutually reinforcing in terms of a generalized
opposition to the expansion of consumer protection.
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mortgage that met the family’s individual assessment of needs because the
Act would deem the family high-risk and unsophisticated.88 The CFPB
would create “a mechanism that [would] ultimately deny some people access
to some products because of their deficiencies in experience, sophistication,
and perhaps even intelligence.”89 The dispute illustrates the conflict between
individualism and government regulation that is intended to protect the
public from itself or from open-market competition.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE VULNERABLE CONSUMER
When this Article refers to consumers, it is referring to hundreds of
millions of people who interact with sellers in markets. Consequently, one
must be cautious about statements implying universalized descriptions of
their attributes. However, proponents and opponents of enhanced consumer
protection must use introspection, observation, and compilations of data to
determine a starting point for their reasoning about a specific consumer
protection suggestion. Legal systems would flounder at the prospect of
creating and enforcing a designer consumer protection package for each
level of consumer mental, psychological, and economic capabilities.
Individualism approaches this challenge by portraying consumers as
rational calculators with extensive information, experience, and mental
awareness.90 No doubt there are customers somewhere who approximate
that portrayal. However, there is a substantial argument for characterizing
consumers quite differently. What would it mean to see them as highly
vulnerable to manipulation by sellers and deficient in terms of the time and
monetary resources that would enable them to move in the direction of the
consumer as conceptualized by adherents of individualism?

88. See Hearing, Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, supra note 83,
at 133 (“So, what about the husband and wife who intend to keep their home until their
children are grown and are willing, for this reason, to accept a prepayment penalty in
order to get a lower rate on their fixed-rate mortgage? The administration is suggesting
that this option might not be available to them if the mortgage provider (and ultimately
the CFP[B]) does not consider them ‘sophisticated’ consumers.”) (statement by Peter
Wallison).
89. Id. (statement by Peter Wallison). In a nutshell, the argument was simple: “As
long as the disclosure is fair and honest, why should anyone be prohibited from buying
a product or service?” Id. at 134 (statement by Peter Wallison).
90. See supra Part II.
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A. What Does It Mean to Be “Vulnerable”?
Both the sociology and social work professions define “vulnerability”
in terms of a lack of ability to protect oneself from two forms of potential
threats to a person’s health and development.91 The logic of examining
vulnerability from the vantage points of these two professions stems from
the recognition that their clients are generally perceived as requiring
assistance from a caring community.92
What kinds of threats create a threat to health and development? First,
some threats are natural to anyone’s life. At certain stages of life, a person
is threatened by an inability to take care of his or her needs for hygiene and
food intake.93 In short, the person is vulnerable.94 A second set of threats is
social in that the threats arise from relationships involving interactions with
others.95 This second threat is the result of power imbalances and the
willingness of some with disproportionate amounts of power to use their
potency to harm the interests of the relatively weak.96
Vulnerability exists in tension with individualism, which assumes that
individuals possess the power to combat whatever hardships may befall
them.97 In marked contrast to this belief pattern, the sociological–social work
perspective concerning vulnerable populations claims that certain

91. See JANET SEDEN, ET. AL., PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL WORK 104
(2011) (defining a vulnerable individual as one “who is in need of community care
services by reason of mental or other disability, age or illness; and who is or may be
unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against
significant harm or exploitation” (quoting DEP’T OF HEALTH, NO SECRETS: GUIDANCE
ON DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING MULTI-AGENCY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO
PROTECT VULNERABLE ADULTS FROM ABUSE 8–9 (2009)).
92. See id. at 104–05.
93. See id. at 105.
94. See id. at 104–05.
95. See id. at 105 (“Vulnerable adults could also include those perceived to be
difficult, as well as others with a long history of violence . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
96. See id.
97. See JANSSON, supra note 30, at 46–47. Jansson argues that conservatives begin
with assumptions contrary to that of the empathetic assumptions of social work:
“[Conservatives] begin with the belief that members of some vulnerable populations
often create their relatively low income by not prizing hard work to the extent of affluent
persons.” Id. at 46. American conservatives then contend, predictably, that “[t]his
tendency toward laziness is promoted, moreover, by those social policies that create
‘perverse incentives.’” Id.
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individuals are overwhelmed by their oppressed lives and the circumstances
and events they are powerless to control.98
According to the sociological perspective, vulnerability stems from the
position of the individual within society.99 Sociologists assert that individuals
become vulnerable when they do not hold a superior position in society.100
This lower position of power within society places the population or
individual at risk of exploitation or harm because limited power in American
society means having a lack of access to resources and a consequent lack of
ability to have one’s voice heard; the absence of voice then makes the
vulnerable individual an easy target for those with the capability and the will
to use others for their egoistic purposes.101 Most importantly, sociology does
not view this state of vulnerability as a condition that people bring upon
themselves, but instead is a result of “social construction.”102
Similar to sociology, social work often assumes that people are “made
98. See generally ALEX GITTERMAN, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE AND
RESILIENT POPULATIONS 1–16 (3d ed. 2014). Gitterman outlines several examples of
vulnerability that exist due to circumstances outside the control of the vulnerable
individual, such as poverty, lack of resources, discrimination, and family upbringing. Id.
For example, Gitterman asserts that “[w]hen community and family supports are weak
or unavailable and when internal resources are impaired, these populations are very
vulnerable to physical, cognitive, emotional and social deterioration.” Id. at 1. As a more
specific example, Gitterman discusses the vulnerability of the American black family and
how that vulnerability stems from “[t]he dramatic economic changes intensified by our
country’s long history of racism and discrimination.” Id. at 7.
99. See Janet Scammell & Gill Calvin Thomas, The Social Construction of
Vulnerability, in UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITY: A NURSING AND HEALTHCARE
APPROACH 111–12 (Vanessa Heaslip & Juile Ryden eds., 2013) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITY].
100. See id. at 123.
101. See id.; see also JANSSON, supra note 30, at 40 (discussing that women, older
people, and LGBT populations have often been kept powerless by excluding them from
“the economic and social mainstream”).
102. See Scammell & Thomas, supra note 99. Scammell and Thomas use the idea of
“social constructionism” to explain how an individual becomes vulnerable. Id. The
authors state that a vulnerable “identity is not one-sided but multi-factorial, [and] that it
is not fixed but changing and is profoundly influenced by context.” Id. at 111. As such,
there are several factors external to the individual that could contribute to someone’s
being vulnerable. See id.; see also SEDEN ET AL., supra note 91, at xiv (identifying that
people are “made vulnerable . . . by poverty, bereavement, addiction, isolation, mental
distress, disability, neglect, abuse or other circumstances”) (quoting DEP’T FOR
CHILDREN, SCH. & FAMILIES, REVISED EVERY CHILD MATTERS OUTCOMES
FRAMEWORK 1 (2008) [hereinafter DEP’T FOR CHILDREN, SCH. & FAMILIES].
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vulnerable”103 by external circumstances that are thrust upon the
individual.104 Social workers believe that characteristics such as race,
citizenship, age, gender, sexuality, and income make some individuals more
vulnerable than others to unjust representations in society, discrimination,
and oppression.105 Besides the circumstances discussed above, social workers
also define vulnerability as the need to be dependent on an outside source
for survival or well-being.106 Children and older adults are the most common
examples of this type of vulnerability.107 As such, social workers often use
the term “vulnerable” to identify those populations that are in need of
protection.108 Would an ordinary consumer have these defining attributes of
vulnerability?
B. Implications of Recognizing Vulnerable Populations
Social work developed as a reaction to the need for professionals who
could assist those who are vulnerable.109 The National Association of Social
Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics states that “[t]he primary mission of the
social work profession is to enhance human well-being and help meet the
basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and
empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in
poverty.”110 More specifically, social work seeks to address the needs of
vulnerable populations by promoting organizations, communities, and social
103. See SEDEN ET AL., supra note 91, at xiv (quoting DEP’T FOR CHILDREN,
SCHOOLS & FAMILIES, supra note 102, at 1).
104. Id. (quoting DEP’T FOR CHILDREN, SCH. & FAMILIES, supra note 102); see also
Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers, NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC.
WORKERS, http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014)
(“Fundamental to social work is attention to the environmental forces that create,
contribute to, and address problems in living.”).
105. See Rowena Fong, Overview of Working with Vulnerable Populations and
Persons at Risk, in SOCIAL WORKERS’ DESK REFERENCE 925, 925 (Albert R. Roberts
ed., 2d ed. 2009).
106. See JANSSON, supra note 30, at 40.
107. Id. (“We can identify dependent vulnerable populations . . ., such as children,
who occupy an unusual status. Generally lacking political clout, children depend on the
goodwill of adults for requisite services, housing, and resources.”).
108. See Vanessa Heaslip, Understanding Vulnerability, in UNDERSTANDING
VULNERABILITY, supra note 99, at 14 (discussing “[v]ulnerability as a mechanism to
identify social groups in need of protection”).
109. See generally Social Work History, NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS, http://www.
naswdc.org/pressroom/features/general/history.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
110. Id.
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institutions that provide assistance, advocacy, and necessary resources for
these populations.111
The social-work perspective places importance on interventions and
solutions to aid or protect those who are vulnerable.112 The primary
institution that is capable of implementing these interventions and solutions
for the vulnerable is the government.113 Rooted in American liberal
assumptions about the role of government, social work favors the argument
that some degree of government is needed to protect and meet the needs of
vulnerable citizens.114
To extend the concept of vulnerability to consumers, with its attendant
argument on behalf of community responsibility for facilitating consumer
welfare, requires the same kind of analysis that encouraged sociology and
social work to label only certain groups vulnerable. Are there power
differentials that shape the flow and quality of information available to
consumers? Is it reasonable to expect consumers to cope with and process
the marketing efforts of large suppliers in complex markets? Do consumers
have the educational background to appreciate the health impacts of a wide

111. Id. (“These [social work] activities may be in the form of direct practice,
community organizing, supervision, consultation administration, advocacy, social and
political action, policy development and implementation, education, and research and
evaluation.”).
112. See Fong, supra note 105. Fong states that social workers need to be aware of
populations and individuals who are vulnerable and “find culturally appropriate
interventions and solutions.” Id.
113. See JANSSON, supra note 30, at 5. Jansson’s text on American society’s distaste
for social welfare discusses an imaginary society absent government assistance. Id.
Jansson then points out the consequences of such a society for those who are vulnerable:
[T]he members of vulnerable populations would be placed in particular
jeopardy by the absence of government programs, regulations, and civil
rights . . . . Such forms of prejudice as racism, homophobia, gender-based
discrimination, ageism, classism, hostility to immigrants, xenophobia, and
dislike of persons with mental and physical issues are deeply rooted in American
society.

Id.
114. See FREDERIC G. REAMER, SOCIAL WORK VALUES AND ETHICS 133 (3d ed.
2006). Reamer states that social work values and ethical principles imply “that it is
appropriate for government agencies to be able to require local communities to
accommodate their fair share of individuals . . . . [which] is . . . consistent with the
guideline that individuals’ right to basic well-being . . . takes precedence over other
individuals’ right to freedom and self-determination.” Id. at 134.
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range of chemicals? Are consumers likely to reflect the kind of logical and
empirical skills required to make the decisions they would like to make from
the perspective of the person they would like to become?
The next Part begins an exploration of these defining characteristics of
vulnerability. It describes consumers as they are, not as they might be inside
the vigorous imagination of someone with interests contrary to theirs.
V. BOUNDED RATIONALITY, WILLPOWER, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
If one considers adults as vulnerable in the marketplace, a good place
to start in appreciating that vulnerability is to focus on the attributes of
individuals that often lead them to make poor choices, seizing upon
irrelevant considerations to support their decisions even as they ignore
important ones. A growing body of study focuses on how human behavior
systemically deviates from a traditional rational-actor model.115 People often
act quite divergently from what would be predicted by a rational-actor
model.116 In other words, their behavior is bounded or restricted by these
deviations.
Often, human preferences are not well-defined, and choices are made
that seem inconsistent with stated preferences. In some contexts, people
systematically make decisions against their own interests or in tension with
what a traditional rationality model would predict.117 Although the

115. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
116. See id. (stating that the use of a limited number of heuristics in decision making
“lead[s] to severe and systematic errors”).
117. See Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences,
Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459,
1469 (2006) (“Since 1955, the role of cognitive biases in decision-making processes has
intrigued behavioral psychologists.”); see generally James H. Barnes, Jr., Cognitive
Biases and Their Impact on Strategic Planning, 5 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 129 (1984); T.K.
Das & Bing-Sheng Tang, Cognitive Biases & Strategic Decision Processes: An Integrative
Approach, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 757 (1999); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). In 1955, “Herbert Simon published A
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, which proposed ‘replac[ing] the global rationality
of economic man with a’ model inclusive of ‘the computational capacities that are
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which
such organisms exist.’” McCann, supra (alteration in original) (quoting Simon supra, at
99). Ever since, “economists, legal scholars, and psychologists have evaluated the
desirability of utilizing cognitive bias analysis in adjusting expectations for human
behavior” and human decisionmaking. Id.
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limitations of human decisionmaking are well-documented in other social
sciences, such as psychology, only recently has an entire branch of legal
study, titled “behavioral law and economics,” explored the implications of
actual human behavior patterns and the law.118
These psychological insights suggest that actual human beings display
both bounded rationality and bounded willpower.119 Due to both cognitive
mental limitations and limited willpower, human decisionmakers tend to
employ simplified rules of thumb or heuristics resulting in cognitive biases
that negatively affect decisionmaking.120 These limitations represent
significant ways in which most people depart from the standards of a
rational-actor model.121 This Part explores the implications of these human
behavior patterns on Americans’ understanding of consumer law and the
assumptions of individualism.
While this Part is not intended to be an exhaustive review of the ways
in which humans are boundedly rational and exhibit bounded willpower, it
provides examples of the countless ways humans and consumers depart from
the traditional economic model of human behavior. These biases suggest
that the vulnerability of consumers is pronounced.122 Recognizing the
fallibility of human judgment and the vulnerability of consumers it creates
suggests constraining individual choice.123
A. Bounded Rationality
“Bounded rationality . . . refers to the obvious fact that human
118. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law & Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, & Implications for Liberty, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012).
119. Jolls et al., supra note 118, at 1476.
120. Id. at 1477–79.
121. See id. 121. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Behavioral Law & Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, & Implications for Liberty, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012).
122. Nevertheless, the extent of the effects of behavioral decision theory are not
without critique. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 551–52 (2004) (suggesting that while
individuals may display cognitive errors in laboratory or controlled experiments, they
may act more rationally in real-world settings).
123. Jolls et al., supra note 118, at 1541 (“Many of the forms of bounded
rationality . . . call into question the idea of consumer sovereignty.”).
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cognitive abilities are not infinite.”124 Even smart people are not as bright as
they might believe. “We have limited computational skills and seriously
flawed memories.”125 This limited ability to compute and remember
information is evidenced in a number of different biases of human
behavior.126
1. Optimism Bias
Optimism bias is an individual’s tendency to assume that general risks
posed by products or situations do not apply to themselves.127 This bias
affects smart people too—even though people may understand the risks,
they believe that those risks do not apply with equal force to themselves.128
“[P]eople typically think that their chances of a range of bad outcomes, from
having an auto accident to contracting a particular disease to getting fired
from a job, are significantly lower than the average person’s chances of
suffering” from these problems.129 Statistically, it cannot be true that
everyone has a lower chance of suffering a bad outcome than the average
person.130 For example, the average American estimates they have about a
one-in-five chance of personally being the victim of a nonterrorist violent
crime, yet believes that the average American has about a two-in-five chance
of being victimized.131

124. Id. at 1477 (citing Simon, supra note 117).
125. Id. Jolls et al. divides “departures from the standard model . . . into two

categories: judgment and decisionmaking. Actual judgments show systematic departures
from models of unbiased forecasts, and actual decisions often violate the axioms of
expected utility theory.” Id.
126. See id.
127. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1511 (1999).
128. See id.
129. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 204 (2006).
130. See id.
131. Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 959, 981 n.82 (2003) (citing Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and
Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism, PSYCHOL. SCI. at 26 (unpublished manuscript)).
For another example of how optimism bias affects individual choice, see Farah Majid,
The Irrationality of Credit Card Debt: Examining the Subconscious Biases of Credit Card
Users, 34 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 165, 169 (2010). Majid describes the theory of how
optimism bias affects credit card users in that “borrowers do not consider that
unexpected, and often costly, emergencies may occur from time-to-time.” Id. This affects
borrower behavior by precluding the realization of how often borrowers use their credit
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In the consumer protection context, optimism bias plays a significant
role in tobacco smokers’ perceptions of risk.132 Studies “suggest[] that
smokers perceive smoking as significantly less risky for themselves than for
other smokers, that smokers view their own risks as not significantly higher
than those for non-smokers, and that smokers tend to underestimate the
actual risks to themselves.”133 Although the undervaluation of risks in
connection to tobacco is a salient example of how consumer biases affect
individualism, optimism bias is not limited to tobacco smokers’ perception
of risk, because any product that has inherent risks that consumers may
underestimate poses a potential problem for consumers.134 And when
cards and often purchase items “that do not promote their welfare . . . while failing to
purchase items that promote their welfare.” Id.
132. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 1511–13.
133. Id. at 1512. Hanson and Kysar summarize recent studies outlining the effect of
optimism bias in estimating tobacco risks. The authors point to a study of “North
Carolinians who completed a health risk appraisal and answered questions about
perceived risks of heart attack, stroke, and cancer. Id. (citing Victor J. Strecher et al., Do
Cigarette Smokers Have Unrealistic Perceptions of Their Heart Attack, Cancer, and
Stroke Risks?, 18 J. BEHAV. MED. 45, 49 (1995)). The study found that smokers “were
36% more likely than nonsmokers to underestimate their risk of heart attack, 137%
more likely to underestimate their risk of cancer, and 55% more likely to underestimate
their risk of stroke.” Id. (citing Strecher et al. supra, at 52–53). A similar study found that
“smokers rated their own chances of contracting [tobacco-related] diseases as similar to
those of the entire population of smokers and non-smokers combined.” Id. at 1513 (citing
Jonathan D. Reppucci et al., Unrealistic Optimism Among Adolescent Smokers and
Nonsmokers, 11 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 227, 235 (1991)). Another study “found that
most smokers do not believe they face an increased risk of heart attack or cancer as
compared with that of other people in their age bracket.” Id. (citing John Z. Ayanian &
Paul D. Cleary, Perceived Risks of Heart Disease and Cancer Among Cigarette Smokers,
281 JAMA 1019, 1020–21 (1999)).
134. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1400
(2004) (discussing how optimism bias affects credit card borrower behavior); Michael A.
McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market Manipulation &
Consumer Choice, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 223–24 (2005) (discussing the effects of
optimism bias on dietary pill consumers). Bar-Gill argues that “[u]nderestimation of
future borrowing may also result from an optimism bias that might lead consumers to
underestimate the likelihood of contingencies bearing economic hardship. . . . [and]
consumers might underestimate the likelihood of adverse events that might generate a
need to borrow.” Bar-Gill, supra (footnote omitted). If “individuals . . . underestimate
the probability that either they or a loved one will become ill and require costly
treatment,” this bias may affect their ability to save and pay for treatment. See id.
Alternatively, if people “underestimate the likelihood that they will lose their job,” this
“and other manifestations of the optimism bias will lead consumers to underestimate the
likelihood that they will be forced to resort to credit card borrowing.” Id. To help
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consumers systematically underestimate risk, manufacturers may more
readily conceal risk information.135 When optimism bias exists in consumer
settings, the law might respond by adopting heightened standards of
manufacturer liability for consumer products as a means of protecting
consumers.136
2. Framing Options
Individuals can also be irrationally distracted by the external framing
of a decision.137 Because “[p]eople are averse to extremes. . . . [a]s between
given alternatives, people seek a compromise.”138 “In this, as in other
respects, the framing of choice matters . . . .”139 Neoclassical economic theory,
the primary exemplar of the assumption of consumer rationality, assumes
that preferences are subject to a stable rank ordering that does not
vacillate.140 Yet, this is often not empirically verifiable.141
Manufacturers routinely employ strategic framing options in the
consumer context to exploit consumer biases.142 For example, automobile
manufacturers routinely make a particular model seem less expensive by
adding a more expensive option to the product line in an effort to encourage
the buyer to choose the cheaper product.143 Alternatively, when a consumer
vulnerable consumers who make these biased decisions, Bar-Gill advocates for more
stringent ex ante protections for credit card consumers such as warnings, disclosures, and
more protective default rules. See id. at 1417.
135. Advertisers are in a position to tailor their messages accordingly to exploit
biases of consumers through “market manipulation.” Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127,
at 1425–26.
136. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 207.
137. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181–
82 (1997).
138. Id. at 1181.
139. Id. at 1181–82.
140. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 35 (1987).
141. See Sunstein, supra note 137, at 1182. (“Extremeness aversion suggests that a
simple axiom of conventional economic theory—involving the irrelevance of added,
unchosen alternatives—is wrong.”).
142. See id. In addition to the consumer context, Sunstein also argues that framing
“has large consequences for legal advocacy and judgment, as well as for predictions
about the effects of law.” Id. Advocates, lawyers, and lawmakers ask: “How can a
preferred option best be framed as the ‘compromise’ choice?” Id. The answer is that “the
compromise solution depends on what alternatives are made available.” Id.
143. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 1440 (explaining how irrelevant third
options affect consumer choice in car sales).
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can choose between purchasing a small or large box of popcorn, he or she
might choose the small.144 That same consumer, however, would more likely
choose the large box when also presented with the option of an extra-large
box.145 If actors were entirely rational, then framing an irrelevant third
choice (in this case, an extra-large box) would not affect the choice between
a small and large box.146
3. Status Quo Bias
“Status quo bias exists when decision makers choose to remain with
the status quo more often than traditional [rational actor] theory would
suggest.”147 “[I]f the . . . preferences of an individual . . . suggest that the
individual make a change in consumption habits, the individual may still
choose to do nothing” to retain the status quo.148 Various cognitive errors
together appear to irrationally wed people to the status quo. One such
example is known as the “endowment effect,” where individuals seem to
require more compensation to part with an endowment than they are willing
to pay to gain it.149
In the consumer context, concern about the status quo bias and the
endowment effect has inspired debate regarding the “proper default rules
for consumer choices involving retirement plans, insurance coverage, and
privacy policies.”150 The status-quo bias is relevant both for the creators of
insurance and retirement policies, as well as the consumers using these
retirement plans or insurance policies. The “cognitive shortcomings that
make regulators reluctant to alter the status quo will tend to make policies

144. Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from
Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 261, 294 (2001).
145. Id.
146. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 42 (1991).
147. Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian
Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 26 (2006).
148. Id. Scharff and Parisi suggest that this behavior favoring the status quo is
demonstrated by “a large body of literature examining the difference between the
willingness to pay (WTP) for the acquisition of a property right and the willingness to
accept compensation (WTA) for the loss of an equivalent property right.” Id. at 26–27.
149. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 39, 43–44 (1980); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect
and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003).
150. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning
for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779, 787–88 (2012).

2015]

Consumer Law and the Vulnerable Consumer

187

‘sticky’ around initial policies.”151 Therefore, “[t]he direction in which the
status quo bias will steer policy . . . depend[s] on the initial policy
endowment.”152 Likewise, consumers might be more unwilling to shift from
a default policy out of a desire to simply preserve the status quo.
4. Vividness Bias
The vividness bias causes individuals to place more weight on concrete,
emotionally interesting information than on more helpful, abstract data.153
Individuals are more influenced by anecdotal, emotionally compelling
testimony than probably more accurate, aggregate data and statistics.154
“[T]he vividness heuristic focuses attention away from abstract evidence,
which is difficult and time consuming to evaluate, to concrete evidence,
which most people have more experience evaluating . . . .”155 Consumers
should be concerned about advertisers, politicians, or others manipulating
their potential to demonstrate this bias because it “creates an incentive for
people to specialize in manipulating the bias to their own ends” to exploit
the vulnerable.156
5. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias suggests that individuals are prone “to ignore or
discount information that challenges existing beliefs.”157 “Confirmation bias
151. Id. at 788. Cooper and Kovacic elaborate that “[f]rom this stickiness emerges a
path dependency in policy choice, where policies adopted in the past have a lingering
impact on future policy adoption.” Id.
152. Id.
153. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55–56 (1980).
154. See Eugene Borgida & Richard E. Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract
vs. Concrete Information on Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 261–62 (1977).
Borgida and Nisbett demonstrate this bias with their experiment on student course
selection. Id. at 261. They gave the students three different sources of information: (1) a
statistical summary of the evaluations of the entire population of students taking the
course, (2) the live comments of a few students, and (3) no evaluations. Id. Statistically,
the impressions of the complete population are more likely to be accurate than the
impressions of a small sample of a few students. However, the students were more
influenced by the anecdotal testimony of the three live students than by the aggregate
data that is likely more accurate. Id. at 266.
155. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 74 (2006).
156. See id.
157. McCann, supra note 117, at 1511.
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is especially prevalent among those who are overconfident, and it frequently
leads to ‘irrational’ decision-making.”158 In the business context, this bias
manifests with individuals avoiding consideration of worst-case scenarios or
refraining from consulting with “Devil’s advocates” advisors.159 However,
the same bias could be applied in more general settings, such as individuals
or consumers failing to consider worst-case scenarios of risky procedures or
failing to consider counterarguments to a course of action.
6. Impact Bias
Researchers have discovered that individuals have difficulty predicting
the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions.160 One major bias,
known as the impact bias, refers to the phenomenon that occurs when people
overestimate how badly they will feel after a negative outcome and how long
that feeling will last.161 “For example, some consumers may make
unnecessary purchases to avoid the anticipated negative feelings they will
have if they forego the purchase.”162 The existence of the impact bias means
that “[c]onsumers . . . are especially prone to miswanting.”163 Consumers
“might believe that a new BMW will make life perfect[,] [b]ut it will almost
certainly be less exciting than we anticipated; nor will it excite us for as long
as predicted.”164 Impact bias “characterizes how [consumers] experience the
dimming excitement over not just a BMW but also over any object or event
that [they] presume will make [them] happy.”165

158. Id. at 1470–71.
159. See id. at 1471 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lynne L. Dallas, The

New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1363, 1394 n.146 (2002)).
160. See Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation,
87 MARQ. L. REV. 817, 818 (2004) (discussing predicted feelings in contrast to
experienced feelings); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 346–47 (2003) (discussing the
forecasting of the duration and intensity of future feelings and emotions).
161. See Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 160, at 349–51.
162. Majid, supra note 131, at 172 (citing Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of
Happiness, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/magazine/07
HAPPINESS.html?pagewanted=all).
163. Id.
164. Gertner, supra note 162.
165. Id.

2015]

Consumer Law and the Vulnerable Consumer

189

B. Bounded Willpower and Imperfect Self-Control
“In addition to bounded rationality, people often display bounded willpower.”166 Bounded willpower “refers to the fact that human beings often
take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-term
interests.”167 Often poor self-control leads to this bounded willpower.168
“[T]he ‘imperfect self-control’ bias states that many [consumers] will
overestimate their own willpower to avoid buying things they want but do
not actually need.”169 For example, New Year’s resolutions to regularly
attend the gym are quickly forgotten in the months following the beginning
of the year.170 Promises to quit sweets are easily forgotten, even though the
promisors had the best intention to honor them.171 Individuals set alarm
clocks with intentions of waking up early, only to turn them off and ignore
their buzz in the morning.172 In the consumer context, this bias translates to
consumers’ “overestimat[ing] their own willpower to avoid buying things
they want but do not actually need.”173 Imperfect self-control informs
consumption and savings decisions and can contribute to insufficient saving
for retirement.174
Many people are able to appreciate the fact that they have limited selfcontrol or bounded willpower and take steps to reduce the effects of this
bias.175 For example, people concerned about weight gain purposefully avoid
keeping tempting desserts in the house.176 Or, “[i]n some cases they may vote
for or support governmental policies, such as social security, to eliminate any

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Jolls et al., supra note 118, at 1479.
Id.
See id.
Majid, supra note 131, at 169 (citing Bar-Gill, supra note 134, at 1375).
Bar-Gill, supra note 134, at 1373 (citing Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike
Malmendier, Overestimating Self-Control: Evidence from the Health Club Industry
(2003)).
171. See id. (citing RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 98 (1992)).
172. Id. (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 58 (1984)).
173. Majid, supra note 131, at 169 (citing Bar-Gill, supra note 134, at 1375).
174. See generally Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and
Behavioral Decision Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC.
BULL. 1 (2010), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p1.html.
175. Jolls et al., supra note 118, at 1479.
176. Id.
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temptation to succumb to the desire for immediate rewards.”177 In this
manner, the demand for law, regulation, and consumer protection may
reflect people’s understanding of their own bounded willpower.178
VI. CONCLUSION
This brief look at the mental shortcuts that human beings
unconsciously take when making decisions signals a pronounced
vulnerability to marketing efforts designed to get individuals to say “yes” to
an offer to purchase consumer goods. The insight that is especially worth
noting about this cognitive heuristic research is that these cognitive
heuristics cannot be controlled by the individual. This insight directly
contradicts the ontological assumption of individualism. Americans are not
the careful rational calculators we might prefer to be.
Consumer law should be a response to consumers as they are, not to
consumers as they are portrayed in a seminar room where orderly,
predictable behavior satisfies their yearning for a world they can understand
and control. But an even larger impediment to consumer protection is the
eagerness of those on the other side of the product and price negotiation
table.
Sellers prefer to speak of consumers as being clever, knowledgeable,
puissant, and rational. They wonder aloud why they would need a muscular
regulatory regime when rational consumers can accomplish the necessary
regulation through their judicious consumption decisions. Were that
characterization correct, the range of acceptable marketing behavior would
be enlarged.
As a metaphor for equal opportunity, Americans often justify public
policies by appealing to the creation of a level playing field. Construction of
such a field requires paying attention to the economic power, technical
sophistication, and mental proclivities of typical consumers. Appeals to

177. Id. (citing Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991)).
178. Id. For an up-to-date, extensive discussion on cognitive heuristic research, see
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). Kahneman describes two
systems of thought: “System 1 thinking,” which is automatic and uncontrolled, and
“System 2 thinking,” which is slow and deliberate and more characteristic of the rational
and calculating picture of human beings painted by individualism. Id. at 20–21.
Kahneman outlines the different ways that System 1 thinking manifests in individuals’
decisionmaking, oftentimes leading to decisions that are not rational or in the best
interest of the individual. See id.
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models of superconsumers who can match the economic power, technical
understandings, and mental sophistication of talented and well-financed
marketing divisions of major firms have little role to play in public policy
debates. Vulnerable consumers are not helpless; they just need a helping
hand.

